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BACKGROUND: The majority of reward learning neuroimaging studies have not focused on the motivational aspects
of behavior, such as the inherent value placed on choice itself. The experience and affective value of personal control
may have particular relevance for psychiatric disorders, including depression.
METHODS: We adapted a functional magnetic resonance imaging reward task that probed the value placed on
exerting control over one’s decisions, termed choice value, in 122 healthy participants. We examined activation
associated with choice value; personally chosen versus passively received rewards; and reinforcement learning
metrics, such as prediction error. Relationships were tested between measures of motivational orientation (catego-
rized as autonomy, control, and impersonal) and subclinical depressive symptoms.
RESULTS: Anticipating personal choice activated left insula, cingulate, right inferior frontal cortex, and ventral
striatum (pfamilywise error–corrected , .05). Ventral striatal activations to choice were diminished in participants with
subclinical depressive symptoms. Personally chosen rewards were associated with greater activation of the insula
and inferior frontal gyrus, cingulate cortex, hippocampus, thalamus, and substantia nigra compared with rewards
that were passively received. In participants who felt they had little control over their own behavior (impersonal
orientation), prediction error signals in nucleus accumbens were stronger during passive trials.
CONCLUSIONS: Previous ﬁndings regarding personal choice have been veriﬁed and advanced through the use of
both reinforcement learning models and correlations with psychopathology. Personal choice has an impact on the
extended reward network, potentially allowing these clinically important areas to be addressed in ways more relevant
to personality styles, self-esteem, and symptoms such as motivational anhedonia.
Keywords: Depression, Imaging, Locus of causality, Perceived control, Reward learning, Value of choice
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bpsc.2018.09.015Disruptions in motivation and reward processing are key ele-
ments of many psychiatric disorders, including anhedonia in
major depressive disorder (MDD), negative symptoms in
schizophrenia, and mania in bipolar disorder (1). Standard
reward tasks (e.g., monetary incentive delay) allow examination
of reward prediction, anticipation, and consumption [for review
see (2,3)]. However, it has become apparent that reward pro-
cessing is affected by whether an individual values being able
to make his or her own choices—the inherent value of exer-
cising personal control (4,5). Being able to exert control over
one’s own environment is beneﬁcial to psychological well-
being (6), making investigations of such concepts relevant for
patient groups and the wider population. Indeed, self-
determination theory (7) argues that our core needs are for
autonomy (experience of enacting personal volition), compe-
tence (sense of mastery over one’s environment), and relat-
edness (social belonging). These determine inclination to
pursue behavior for its own intrinsic enjoyment (8), which is at
the heart of motivational anhedonia.ª 2018 Society of Biological Psychiatry. Pu
N: 2451-9022 Biological Psychiatry: Cognitive NeuroDerived from self-determination theory is the concept of the
locus of causality, describing the source from which a person
perceives his or her behaviors to be motivated (9): 1)
Autonomy-oriented individuals are intrinsically self-motivated,
seeking out opportunities for information gathering, personal
challenge, and self-determination. 2) Control-oriented in-
dividuals take cues from environmental factors, e.g., reward,
deadlines, and public opinion. 3) Impersonal-oriented
individuals feel they have little intentional control over their
behavior, deferring to concepts such as luck or fate. Notably,
the impersonal orientation has previously been associated with
depressive symptoms within healthy individuals (9).
Factor analysis suggests that the causality orientations
have partial overlap with personality concepts described
by the NEO Five-Factor Inventory: Control shares variance with
agreeableness, and impersonal shares variance with neuroti-
cism, whereas autonomy stands as a separate entity (10).
Moreover, whereas traits such as neuroticism are relatively
stable over the life span and have a signiﬁcant geneticblished by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the
CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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dynamic (12) and is likely more environmentally adaptive.
Neurobiologically, the feeling of personal control (13), even
when illusory (14), is associated with striatal activation, which
suggests it may itself incur an additional value signal not typi-
cally captured by reward-learning paradigms. Leotti and
Delgado (15,16) attempted to isolate this within a reward
learning context by testing whether the mere anticipation of
control, elicited by a cue signaling an opportunity to make a
choice versus a passive selection, would recruit neural systems
of reward. They found that cues indicating personal control eli-
cited greater reward system activation in both reward-obtaining
(15) and loss-avoiding (16) contexts. However, this previous
paradigm did not clearly dissociate between choice anticipation
and receipt of the reward itself. In the present study, we have
adapted this value of choice task to clearly separate anticipation
and outcome phases of choice and applied reinforcement
learning models to better characterize the relationship between
the value of choice and neural activation in healthy individuals.
Speciﬁcally, our aims were to 1) verify previous ﬁndings
concerning choice-anticipatory activation; 2) determine if re-
sponses to rewards differ according to whether or not they were
personally won or passively received; 3) establish that, with
appropriatemodiﬁcation of the original paradigm, computational
models of reinforcement learning can explain observed brain
activity; and 4) determine whether elicited activation covaries
with subclinical depressive symptoms and personality factors
relevant to depression, namely, neuroticism and measures of
causality orientation. We anticipated that high neuroticism and
impersonal scores would be associated with diminished acti-
vation to the inherent value of choice because depression has
been linked to other types of blunted reward value (17). We were
particularly interested in the roles that the striatum and dopa-
minergic midbrain may play, given their key importance in rein-
forcement learning, incentive salience, and hedonic signaling.
METHODS AND MATERIALS
Participants
Individuals were selected from a wider ongoing study [Strati-
fying Resilience and Depression Longitudinally (18)] and un-
derwent lifetime diagnostic screening using the Structured
Clinical Interview for DSM-IV-TR Axis I Disorders (19) and DSM-
IV-TR criteria. Only individuals without a lifetime diagnosis of
major mental illness were included in the current analyses,
which were performed when data from the ﬁrst 149 healthy
control participants were available. The following people were
excluded: 15 people owing to nonperformance of the task (no
response or incorrect for .33% of trials), 6 people owing to
scan acquisition technical difﬁculties, and 6 people owing to
excessive motion (more than three events involving motion
greater than [0.5 3 largest voxel dimension = 2.5 mm]). After
these exclusions, there were 122 participants. All participants
provided written informed consent, and the study was
approved by local and regional ethics committees.
Neuropsychology and Behavioral Analyses
Neuropsychological data collected included the General
Causality Orientations Scale (20), which examines the sources2 Biological Psychiatry: Cognitive Neuroscience and Neuroimaging - 2from which a person is motivated to act (9) and consists of
three dimensions: autonomy, control, and impersonal.
Neuroticism scores, the severity of depressive symptoms, and
handedness were also assessed (see Supplement).
Neuroimaging Data Acquisition and Preprocessing
Data were acquired using a 3T magnetic resonance imaging
scanner (repetition time = 1.56 seconds) (see Supplement).
Modiﬁed Inherent Value of Choice Imaging Task
The task was adapted from Leotti and Delgado (15) and
implemented in NeuroBehavioural Systems Presentation soft-
ware (NeuroBehavioural Systems Presentation, Inc., Berkeley,
CA). Each trial had three phases (Figure 1): 1) the cue phase,
where participants learned whether they would personally be
making the reward decision (choice value trial) or would be
following the computer’s direction (no-choice value trial); 2) the
selection phase, whereby a decision was made between a
yellow or blue card; and 3) the outcome phase, when partici-
pants received a probabilistic reward according to their deci-
sion. During the selection phase, participants were able to
freely select their preferred card during choice trials; on no-
choice trials, a rectangle appeared around the card that the
computer had selected for them, which they were obliged to
conﬁrm. Selections were made via a button press.
In the original task, the yellow and blue cards shared equal
reward contingencies. In our adaptation, they had different
contingencies to permit modeling of reinforcement learning: the
yellow card was associated with an 80% chance of a 100-point
reward, and the blue card was associated with a 20% chance.
The alternative outcome was 0 points. We also introduced 1500
to 4000 ms of jitter between selection and outcome phases of
each trial, allowing for disambiguation of all three phases.
Participants completed 66 trials, 33 choice and 33 no-
choice. Trial order and the side of the screen on which the
yellow and blue cards appeared were randomized, preventing
ﬁnal action planning. Decisions made by the participant during
choice trials were mirrored by the computer with a three-trial
lag during no-choice trials in an effort to match the overall
rewards received across conditions of interest. Total task
length was 14 minutes 59 seconds.
Participants were told their objective was to learn by trial
and error which color card was more likely to give them points.
They were informed that for some trials they would get to
choose, but for others the computer would choose for them.
During the latter trials, they had to follow the computer’s
selection. Participants were also told that the reward contin-
gencies remained consistent regardless of whether they or the
computer were doing the choosing. A questionnaire adminis-
tered after scanning asked participants to rate their desire to
win points on a scale of 1 to 10 and their preference for choice
or no-choice trials.
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Data
Analysis
Two analytic approaches were adopted:
1. The basic model was used to (a) verify that appropriate
reward responses were seen for the outcome phase018; -:-–- www.sobp.org/BPCNNI
Figure 1. Modiﬁed inherent value of choice task.
ITI, intertrial interval.
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(b) verify the results previously reported by Leotti and Del-
gado (15) regarding cue phase choice . no-choice acti-
vation; (c) assess choice . no-choice activation during the
reward phase and the choice 3 reward interaction; and (d)
examine the associations between contrasts from (a) and
(b) with the three General Causality Orientations Scale
causality orientations (autonomy, control, impersonal),
neuroticism, and depressive symptoms.
2. The Pavlovian reward learning model attempted use a
computational framework to estimate how much each
participant valued being able to choose by ﬁtting a temporal
difference learning model to the data. This considered the
cue phase choice and no-choice indicators as though they
were stimuli to be conditioned on subsequently obtained
rewards. We proposed that the degree to which the model’s
value estimate accounted for choice anticipatory activation
would be dependent on causality orientation, neuroticism,
and depressive symptoms.Basic Model
This was modeled at the ﬁrst level as a series of delta functions
convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function,
the onsets of which were denoted by experimental conditions
of interest. These were the onsets of the choice and no-choice
cues and the onsets of trial outcome, with choice/no-choice
and 0/100 points being modeled separately, giving six exper-
imental vectors of interest. Nuisance regressors included the
onsets of yellow/blue selection, trials where an incorrect
response or no response was received, and motion
parameters.
At the second level, cue phase contrasts of choice .
baseline and no-choice . baseline were entered into a
random-effects ﬂexible factorial analysis, modeling the factors
of participant and choice/no-choice. The outcome phase was
considered in a separate 2 3 2 ﬂexible factorial analysis
incorporating the contrasts of choice 100 . baseline, choice
0 . baseline, no-choice 100 . baseline, and no-choice 0 .
baseline, modeling the factors of participant, choice/no-
choice, and reward amount (see Supplement). For bothBiological Psychiatry: Cognitive Neuroscienmodels, each participant’s desire to win points and any dif-
ference in points received for choice versus no-choice trials
were included as nuisance covariates. Regions identiﬁed as
showing signiﬁcant activation for the contrasts of interest were
subject to extraction of the ﬁrst eigenvariate for the supra-
threshold cluster and their relationships with our covariates of
interest explored (autonomy, control, impersonal, Quick
Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology [QIDS] depressive
symptoms, and Eysenck Personality Questionnaire Revised
neuroticism scores). This was done using backward regression
in IBM SPSS Version 23 (IBM Corp., Armonk, NY): for each
extracted region, the model that best accounted for the data
was identiﬁed by analysis of variance; within this, signiﬁcant
coefﬁcients of explanatory covariates were reported. These
were subjected to false discovery rate correction with Q = .05
across all comparisons, and standardized b values were
reported.
Pavlovian Reward Learning Model
The task was also modeled as an instance of classical con-
ditioning, using a temporal difference learning model (21). We
wished to identify if learning rate varied according to whether
or not participants were actively choosing. The model imple-
mented four different learning rates, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8, used
to generate cue value and prediction error (PE) estimates
across the task for each participant based on their cue-
outcome experiences during the scan. The unconditioned
stimulus was the outcome phase of each trial (the receipt of
100 or 0 points). The conditioned stimuli were the choice and
no-choice indicators during the cue phase (see Supplement).
Cue value was used to modulate trial-by-trial regressors rep-
resenting the cue phase of each trial, and PE was used to
modulate the outcome phase. Choice and no-choice condi-
tions were modeled separately. These were entered into ﬁrst-
level SPM analyses, with a different SPM for each learning
rate. Contrast estimates for each regressor were taken into
second-level 2 3 4 ﬂexible factorial analyses, which modeled
the main effects of participant, choice/no-choice, and learning
rate. As we expected choice value estimates to strongly covary
with measures of autonomy, control, impersonal, neuroticism,
and depression scores, these were included in the second-ce and Neuroimaging - 2018; -:-–- www.sobp.org/BPCNNI 3
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choice and learning rate.
For both the basic and Pavlovian models, second-level
contrasts were evaluated at a whole-brain voxel height
threshold of pfamilywise error–corrected , .05. Given a priori interest
in the striatum and dopaminergic midbrain, we also conducted
region-of-interest analyses within a structurally deﬁned mask
comprising bilateral caudate, putamen, and dopaminergic
midbrain (see Supplement). Masked voxels were reported as
signiﬁcantly activated if they exceeded a familywise error–
corrected height threshold of p , .05.
RESULTS
Demographics, Neuropsychology, and Symptoms
Median age of participants was 62 years, and 46% were men
(Table 1). There was no correlation between age and task
performance (p . .823). Of participants, 93% preferred making
their own choices. Learning continued throughout the task,
with the most rewarding card being chosen 79% of the time
during the ﬁnal quarter of the session (Supplemental
Figure S3). Both QIDS depression (s = .213, p = .003) and
impersonal scores (s = .197, p = .003) were positively corre-
lated with neuroticism.
Basic Model: (a) Reward Veriﬁcation
See Supplement.
Basic Model: (b) Verifying Anticipation of Choice:
Cue Phase
Cue phase choice . no-choice revealed strong activation in
the cerebellum, left insula, left cingulate/supplementary motor
area, and right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), corrected for whole-
brain volume (Figure 2 and Table 2). Bilateral putamen was
activated within the striatum/midbrain a priori mask (Figure 3A).Table 1. Demographic, Personality, Symptom, and Behavior Me
Measure (Possible Range) Median (IQR)
Age, Years 62.0 (3.00)
Sex, F/M 56/66
Handedness, R/L/A 111/5/6
GCOS: Autonomy (12–84) 68 (10)
GCOS: Control (12–84) 48 (10)
GCOS: Impersonal (12–84) 37 (16)
Neuroticism (0–12) 2 (3)
QIDS (0–27) 3 (2)
Desire to Win (1–10) 7.5 (4.0)
Trial Preference, Choice/No-Choice 114/9
Points Won (0–6600) 3500 (1200)
No-Choice/Choice Points 0.623 (0.39)
No-Choice Trials Missed (0–33) 1.00 (3.00)
Only signiﬁcant correlations between personality and symptom measure
preselected by the computer were deﬁned as missed. SE of skewness was
A, ambidextrous; F, female; GCOS, General Causality Orientations Sca
Depressive Symptomatology; R, right.
4 Biological Psychiatry: Cognitive Neuroscience and Neuroimaging - 2No-choice . choice showed activation in occipital cortex only
(Table 2).
Basic Model: (c) Reward and Choice: Outcome
Phase
Next we examined whether responses to personally earned
outcomes differed from those passively received. The outcome
phase choice . no-choice contrast showed signiﬁcant acti-
vation in the bilateral insula, anterior cingulate, right IFG, left
hippocampus, and left thalamus (Figure 2 and Table 3). Within
the striatum/midbrain region of interest, there was signiﬁcant
choice . no-choice activation within the left substantia nigra
and right caudate nucleus. No-choice . choice activated left
middle frontal cortex, precuneus, and angular gyrus.
Reward 3 Choice Interaction Activations
The contrast of choice (0 . 100) . no-choice (0 . 100)
showed activation in right IFG pars opercularis (Table 3).
Conjunction analysis conﬁrmed that this lay within the choice
. no-choice cluster (pfamilywise error–corrected = .038) but not that
of 0 . 100 (Figure 4A). Contrast estimates suggested
enhanced activation when one personally failed to win
(Figure 4B).
Relations to Traits of Interest
QIDS depressive symptoms were negatively related to left
putamen anticipation: choice . no-choice (b = 2.365, p ,
.001) (Figure 3B). During the outcome phase, autonomy had a
positive association with right IFG and insula choice . no-
choice activation (b = .280, p = .045), whereas impersonal
demonstrated the inverse relationship (b = 2.255, p = .025).
Within precuneus, control had a positive relationship during
outcome: no-choice . choice activation (b = .396, p , .001).
Conversely, impersonal showed a negative association in the
same region (b = 2.288, p = .012) (Supplemental Figure S4).asures
Skewness Kurtosis
Kendall’s s
Correlation (p)
(Neuroticism)
20.574 0.630
20.881 1.071
20.007 0.637
20.176 20.714 .197 (.003)
1.217 1.843
1.262 2.382 .213 (.003)
20.742 20.047
20.384 0.017
20.044 21.167
1.840 2.675
s are shown. No-choice trials where the participant chose the card not
0.220 and of kurtosis was 0.437.
le; IQR, interquartile range; L, left; M, male; QIDS, Quick Inventory of
018; -:-–- www.sobp.org/BPCNNI
Figure 2. Choice. no-choice activation during the
cue (red) and outcome (green) phases. (A) Left
cingulate cortex. (B) Left hippocampus and thalamus.
(C) Anterior insula and inferior frontal cortex. (D) Left
substantia nigra. Images shown achieve a whole-
brain voxel height signiﬁcance threshold of pfamilywise
error–corrected, .05.
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control (b = .226, p = .039). Table 4 details these relationships.Pavlovian Reward Learning: Value of Personal
Choice
The ﬁnal analytical thread considered whether the ability to
choose was intrinsically rewarding in itself, within a reinforce-
ment learning context. During the cue phase of each trial, there
were no main effects of choice/no-choice or learning rate.
However, as anticipated, there was signiﬁcant covariation with
several metrics of interest (Table 5). Increasing autonomy was
associated with greater no-choice . choice value estimates inTable 2. Choice or No-Choice Anticipatory Activation During Cu
Contrast Region
MNI Coordinate
x y
Choice . No-Choice L cerebellum 238 256
L insula 240 16
R IFG 50 12
L cingulate/SMA 210 28
R insula 40 18
L putamen 220 10
R putamen 22 12
No-Choice . Choice R occipital cortex 12 288
L occipital cortex 218 282
FWE-corrected p values are for the whole-brain volume except where n
FWE, familywise error; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; L, left; MNI, Montreal N
aFWE-corrected signiﬁcance within the striatum/midbrain mask.
Biological Psychiatry: Cognitive Neuroscienright amygdala (p = .008) and greater choice. no-choice value
estimates in anterior caudate (p = .019). Again during the cue
phase, control orientation demonstrated a positive relationship
with learning rate in the right superior temporal sulcus (p = .017).
During the outcome phase, there was a signiﬁcant main
effect of learning rate (a) in ventral striatum, with a lower a
being associated with greater PE representation (p , .001).
Conversely, there was an effect of increasing a in the right
anterior insula and supplementary motor area (p , .006).
Learning in ventral striatum therefore appears to operate over a
longer timescale than in insula and supplementary motor area.
Finally, impersonal showed a stronger PE representation for
no-choice . choice in bilateral nucleus accumbens (p , .004)e Phase
s
Voxels t z pFWE-correctedz
252 55 5.57 5.24 .001
2 63 5.29 5.01 .004
6 24 5.06 4.81 .010
32 20 5.04 4.80 .010
6 5 4.68 4.48 .038
22 84 4.33 4.17 .008a
24 55 4.19 4.04 .012a
22 118 6.56 6.05 , .001
214 148 6.11 5.69 , .001
oted (see footnote below).
eurological Institute; R, right; SMA, supplementary motor area.
ce and Neuroimaging - 2018; -:-–- www.sobp.org/BPCNNI 5
Figure 3. (A) Choice . no-choice anticipation
(cue phase) contrast demonstrating activation in
bilateral putamen. (B) Relationship between Quick
Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology (QIDS)
depression score and left (L) putamen activation
(b = 2.365, p , .001). (C) L nucleus accumbens
shows a correlation between impersonal orientation
and no-choice . choice effect for outcome phase
prediction error encoding. (D) The relationship be-
tween impersonal orientation and L nucleus accum-
bens outcome phase prediction error activation. For
panels (A) and (C), results achieve a voxel-height
signiﬁcance of pfamilywise error–corrected , .05 within the
striatum/midbrain mask.
Choice, Reward Learning, and Causality Orientation
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corrected can be found in the Supplement.
DISCUSSION
In this study, we modiﬁed Leotti and Delgado’s 2011 inherent
reward of choice task (15) to 1) verify their previous ﬁndings, 2)
disambiguate the cue and outcome phases, 3) demonstrate the
utility of computational models in this context, and 4)
see whether task-elicited activation covaried with personality
factors of relevance to depression. Their ﬁndings concerning
choice anticipation were replicated within our larger indepen-
dent sample of healthy control subjects. The task was
amenable to Pavlovian reward learning analysis. We then
demonstrated a series of novel ﬁndings within regions key to
reward and depression, their relationship to depressive symp-
toms, and measures that attempt to personalize
notions of reward and value. This aligns them with the
depressive phenomena of motivational anhedonia and deval-
uation of the self.
Anticipating Choice
We veriﬁed the striatal anticipatory response to choice as
seen in Leotti and Delgado (15). Critically, we observed that
this effect was diminished in participants with more depres-
sive symptoms, suggesting an impairment in the hedonic
value or salience attributed to personal choice. Reduced6 Biological Psychiatry: Cognitive Neuroscience and Neuroimaging - 2ventral striatal reward-linked responses are a well-replicated
ﬁnding in patients with MDD, be it when viewing positive
images (22), which correlates with anhedonia (23), or antici-
pating and receiving rewarding outcomes (24,25). In healthy
control subjects, depressive symptoms correlate with a
reduction in the usual performance-enhancing effects of
positive feedback, implying striatal dysfunction (26). Striatal
activation correlates with enhanced recall of personally cho-
sen items and exerts a modulatory effect over hippocampus
(27): this mechanism may underpin the cognitive biases
observed in MDD. It is notable that we too report striatal
dysfunction in a group of healthy control participants, who
have not been subject to the effects of medication or an
episodic illness, while having a narrower distribution of
depressive symptoms. We also found enhanced insula and
cingulate activation during choice . no-choice anticipation:
these regions have been shown to correlate with momentary
subjective well-being in rewarding contexts (28), supporting
the view that personal choice is intrinsically appetitive. Both
are key components of the salience network and play a role in
cognitive control (29).
Personally Earned Versus Passively Received
Rewards
Responses to personally chosen outcomes were enhanced
compared with those that were passively received: insula/IFG018; -:-–- www.sobp.org/BPCNNI
Table 3. Outcome Phase Activation: Choice Versus No-Choice
Contrast Region
MNI Coordinates
Voxels t z pFWE-correctedx y z
Choice . No-Choice R insula/IFG 36 20 28 1789 8.93 Inf , .001
R cingulate/medial superior frontal cortex 0 38 28 3125 7.78 7.47 , .001
L insula 236 20 210 303 6.05 5.90 , .001
L ventral anterior thalamus 212 22 26 34 4.69 4.62 .024
L hippocampus 226 26 216 4 4.60 4.53 .034
L substantia nigra 28 214 214 122 4.45 4.38 .003a
R caudate 12 4 8 4 3.85 3.81 .030a
No-Choice . Choice L MFG 230 30 52 75 5.40 5.29 .001
L precuneus 22 264 32 36 4.81 4.73 .015
L angular gyrus 248 262 24 27 4.80 4.72 .015
Choice (0 . 100) . No-Choice (0 . 100) R IFG 34 20 10 5 4.56 4.50 .038
FWE-corrected p values are for the whole-brain volume except where noted (see footnote below).
FWE, familywise error; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; Inf, inﬁnite; L, left; MFG, middle frontal gyrus; MNI, Montreal Neurological Institute; R, right.
aFWE-corrected signiﬁcance within the striatum/midbrain mask.
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thalamus, and substantia nigra. Right IFG pars opercularis
demonstrated a choice 3 reward interaction, whereby there
was an enhanced response when participants personally failed
to win. Right IFG pars opercularis plays a speciﬁc role (30) in
the inhibition of motor and affective responses (31). It is also
activated by personal regret versus simple disappointment
(32). It could be argued that personally failing to win induces a
self-blame response (33) that requires inhibition or emotionalBiological Psychiatry: Cognitive Neuroscienregulation. Such a response would be relevant to depression
and particularly to resilience in the face of adversity (34).
Inferior Frontal Gyrus and Goal-Sensitive Self-
Regulation
Right IFG and insula showed a choice . no-choice response
across the sample during the outcome phase, which was
enhanced by high autonomy but diminished by highFigure 4. Choice 3 reward interaction within right
(R) inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) during the outcome
phase. (A) Activation maps for choice . no-choice
(red), reward 0 . 100 (green), and choice 3 reward
interaction (blue), displayed at a whole-brain voxel-
wise familywise error–corrected threshold of p , .05.
(B) Contrast estimates extracted from the interaction
cluster.
ce and Neuroimaging - 2018; -:-–- www.sobp.org/BPCNNI 7
Table 4. Relationships Between Signiﬁcant Activation Clusters and Metrics of Interest (GCOS Causality Orientation,
Neuroticism, and QIDS Depressive Symptoms)
Phase Region Contrast Metric Standardized b t (df) pcorrected
Cue L putamen Choice . no-choice QIDS 2.365 3.734 (113) , .001
Outcome R IFG/insula Choice . no-choice Autonomy .280 2.253 (113) .045
Impersonal 2.255 2.758 (113) .025
L precuneus No-choice . choice Control .396 4.888 (114) , .001
Impersonal 2.288 2.986 (115) .012
QIDS .226 2.467 (113) .039
GCOS, General Causality Orientations Scale; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; L, left; QIDS, Quick Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology; R, right.
Choice, Reward Learning, and Causality Orientation
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CNNIimpersonal scores. The concept of locus of causality is not far
removed from that of learned helplessness, which inspired an
animal model of MDD and gave ventral prefrontal cortex (IFG)
particular prominence in a recent update by its architects Maier
and Seligman (35). Prolonged aversive events are proposed to
stimulate the raphe nuclei, releasing serotonin within the
striatum (inhibiting behavior) and amygdala (inducing fear and
anxiety), regardless of detected contingencies. This response
is inhibited if the agent has previous experience of acting to
escape aversive events, mediated by the regulatory inﬂuence
of ventral prefrontal cortex over the raphe nuclei and striatum.
Maier and Seligman suggest that this process equates to the
agent’s being able to imagine having control over future aver-
sive situations. Right IFG and insula are crucial contributors to
cognitive control, governing the ability to select and maintain
goal-directed action at the expense of other alternatives (36).
Strong evidence from a meta-analysis supports their role in the
cognitive reappraisal of emotional stimuli (37). Reduced re-
sponses to negative affective stimuli have been reliably
demonstrated in patients with MDD (38). In this study, we show
the response of IFG to personal choice is greater in individuals
having high autonomy and reduced in individuals having an
impersonal, passive style. The latter may therefore have a
reduced ability to act to escape aversive situations and regu-
late subcortical limbic responses to aversive events, whereas
the former would be more adaptive and resilient. Bhanji et al.
(39) linked resilience to believing one has personal control: theyTable 5. Pavlovian Conditioning of Choice Versus No-Choice
Phase Contrast Region
Cue (CS) 3 Model Value Autonomy 3 (no-choice .
choice)
R basolateral amygd
Autonomy 3 (choice .
no-choice)
L dorsal anterior cau
Autonomy 3 decreasing a L anterior caudate
Control 3 increasing a R superior temporal
Outcome (US) 3 Model
Prediction Error
Main effect: decreasing a B ventral striatum
Main effect: increasing a R insula
Main effect: increasing a L supplementary mo
Impersonal 3 (no-choice .
choice)
B nucleus accumben
Multiplication sign (3) denotes an interaction between a General Cau
corrected p values are for the whole-brain volume except where noted (see
B, bilateral; CS, conditioned stimulus; FWE, familywise error; L, left; MN
aFWE-corrected signiﬁcance within the striatum/midbrain mask.
8 Biological Psychiatry: Cognitive Neuroscience and Neuroimaging - 2found that one’s ability to overcome setbacks was reduced
following exposure to an acute stressor; however, this was
diminished in people who believed that they had some control
over the setbacks.Precuneus and Agency Perception
The precuneus showed a no-choice . choice response during
the outcome phase, especially so in participants with high
control, with the opposite being seen with high impersonal
scores. Precuneus is part of the default mode network and
generally deactivates during goal-directed tasks (40). This
happens to a lesser degree during tasks having a self-
referential component, taking a ﬁrst-person perspective, or
inducing the experience of agency (41). It also activates when
mentally simulating the actions of another versus oneself (42),
taking perspectives alternative to one’s own (43), and
considering the emotional states of both oneself and others
versus neutral judgments (44). More abstractly, it is activated
during judgments of intentional versus simple physical cau-
sality (45). In summary, it is arguable that any process that
involves consideration of an intentional agent engages pre-
cuneus, regardless of whether this is one’s own self, although
the self is likely to prevail during default mode operations. The
control orientation may increase the propensity to seek cues in
the minds of others and consider the computer’s intentions.
Conversely, the impersonal orientation shows an apparentMNI
Coordinates
Voxels t z pFWE-correctedx y z
ala 26 0 224 14 4.72 4.69 .008
date 218 18 8 20 4.49 4.46 .019
218 26 4 32 4.72 4.70 .003
sulcus 48 224 26 31 4.52 4.49 .017
212 10 212 51 5.81 5.76 , .001
234 20 8 37 5.09 5.05 .005
tor area 24 22 44 132 5.29 5.24 .002
s 212 16 210 23 4.44 4.41 .004a
sality Orientations Scale subscale and the contrast described. FWE-
footnote below).
I, Montreal Neurological Institute; R, right; US, unconditioned stimulus.
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CNNIabolition of the effect seen in the general sample, suggesting a
reduced inclination to consider intentionality at all.
Reinforcement Learning
The ﬁnal analysis phase attempted to capture the learning
process underlying how the choice/no-choice cues developed
their inherently rewarding character and how this related to
participants’ characteristics. The use of a computational model
potentially allows for a more mechanistic understanding of the
activation observed and highlighted relationships with per-
sonality metrics that were not detected during the basic
analysis. Highly autonomous people encoded value during
presentation of the no-choice cue within right amygdala,
suggesting that either no-choice cues (46) or the uncertainty
associated with what the computer might select (47) was
regarded as aversive. They also showed greater choice . no-
choice cue valuations in dorsal anterior caudate, which
through its interactions with prefrontal cortex plays a crucial
role in goal-directed action (48). High control participants
showed enhanced learning in the right superior temporal sul-
cus, which is especially involved in considering the intentions
of external others (49). Finally, high impersonal participants
had stronger nucleus accumbens PE signals for passively
received rewards, suggesting that a reduced belief in the ability
to control one’s behavior related to more reward system
reactivity to gifted versus earned rewards.
Limitations
A number of study participants were unable to perform the
task correctly, suggesting that it was subjectively hard to un-
derstand or that a potentially important section of the popu-
lation was excluded. We have not examined trial-by-trial
assessments of choice preference or changes in stay/switch
behavior, which are also believed to covary with depressive
symptoms (26). The 80:20 yellow:blue reward contingency was
used to permit reliable learning across a range of participants
and may have induced ceiling effects in some participants, as
we did not ﬁnd a simple interaction between choice/no-choice
and learning rate. However, it allowed us to focus on whether
or not the participant did the choosing, without that choice in
itself being particularly onerous. Indeed, additional confounds
may have been introduced if there was a difference in decision-
related deliberation between the choice and no-choice con-
ditions. Alternatively, our temporal difference learning model
may not have adequately captured the variance introduced by
personal choice.
Clinical Relevance
Our ﬁndings suggest that the modiﬁed inherent value of choice
task could provide useful insights into the neurobiology of
MDD. Within this large sample of healthy control subjects, we
have shown how personal choice modulates activation within
areas known to be disrupted in MDD. This covaries with how
inclined participants are to see themselves as drivers of their
actions, to look to the outside world for their cues, or even to
feel at a loss as to why they act at all. Being able to tease apart
how particular manifestations of personality impact one’s
vulnerability to MDD is likely to be important to stratiﬁcation.
Characteristics such as causality orientation arguably build onBiological Psychiatry: Cognitive Neuroscienmore stable and heritable measures such as neuroticism, as
they are more responsive to environmental events and so may
provide more timely information regarding the risk of transition
to illness as well as offering targets for psychotherapeutic in-
terventions. The hope is that by examining the reward system
in a manner that ties self-perception to behavior, more clini-
cally applicable insights can be drawn. For example, a partic-
ularly effective therapeutic strategy for individuals having a
high impersonal/low autonomy style might be to both enhance
dopaminergic transmission and challenge self-orientation be-
liefs during cognitive behavioral therapy.
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